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COMMENT

Determining the Timeliness of a
Securities Claim Filed for
Arbitration: Substantive Eligibility
Requirement or Procedural Statute
of Limitations?
I. INTRODUCTION

The ever-growing popularity of alternative dispute resolution has changed the

face of securities aibitration.'
The era when securities arbitration was
characterizedas a "one-day proposition which even inexperienced litigators waited
until the last minute to prepare for," no longer exists. Each day, cases heard in
the securities arbitration fora are increasing in complexity, length, and size of

monetary awards.'

Today, securities arbitration is considered to be nearly as

complex as traditional litigation.4

A growing debate is adding fuel to the already-complex securities arbitration
arena. In a nutshell, the issue is whether a claim for arbitration is filed within the
time limit contained in the rules governing arbitration.' In general, under the

1. See J. Stratton Shartel, SecuridesArbitrationAttorneysDescribeDiverse Strategies,8 INSIU fs
14, 14 (1994). Mr. Shartel believes "the factor most responsible for changing the face of securities
arbitration" may be the U.S. Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon,
482 U.S. 220 (1987). Id at 15. In McMahon, the Court held arbitration was the preferred method
for resolving federal securities claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. See Id See also Carroll E. Neesemann, The State of the Law,
in SECURITES ARBITRATION 1992, at 403 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.
781, 1992). The decision had the effect of substantially increasing the number of securities arbitration
cases. Shartel, supra, at 15. In fact, "since 1989, the Supreme Court has moved forward to eliminate
barriers to arbitration of virtually any dispute related to the securities industry." Neesemann, supra,
at 407.
2. Shartel, supra note 1, at 14. Mr. Shastel noted that as arbitration has become more popular,
the cases have grown more complex. See Id
3. Id.
The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD), one of several self-regulating
organizations (SROs) which handle the vast majority of securities arbitrations, reports that
in 1980, 318 securities arbitration cases were filed. By 1993, that number had risen to
5,419. Damages requested in NASD arbitration cases rose from $56.9 milion in 1983
to $499.9 million in 1993.
Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 19.
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rules of self-regulating organizations (SROs), a controversy is not "eligible" for
submission to arbitration if six or more years have elapsed from the date of the
event giving rise to the dispute. 6 Though a seemingly simple rule, the circuits are
split with regard to its interpretation. 7
Specifically, the debate centers around this question: Is the arbitration rule
a substantive eligibility rule granting jurisdiction to the arbitrator, or is it merely
a procedural limitation on the already-obtained jurisdiction of the arbitrator? The
distinction between these two interpretations is whether a court or an arbitrator
determines if the claim was timely filed.
Not surprisingly, this issue has borne several sub-issues including: (1) what
is the "occurrence or event" triggering the start of the time limitation for
arbitrability; (2) if the legal statute of limitations on the claim has not run, may
the claim be brought in court even after the time limit for arbitration has run; (3)
may the time period be tolled by equitable considerations; (4) may arbitration be
stayed if the legal statute of limitations on the claim has run; and (5) can a
claimant effect an end-run around the time limitation by taking the claim to court
and asking the court to send the case to arbitration.'
This Comment will focus on the development of this debate, the positions
taken by the courts, and a possible resolution of these issues by the SROs
themselves.9 Specifically, Part II briefly discusses the development of arbitration
in the United States; Part III discusses the issues surrounding the debate, including
what positions the courts have taken; and Part IV discusses the possible resolution
of this debate by amendment to the SRO codes.

II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECURITIES ARBITRATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Generally speaking, arbitration as a form of dispute resolution derives its
jurisdiction from the agreement between the parties to submit their grievances to
an arbitrator."0 In 1925, Congress intended to place arbitration agreements "upon

6. Id.
7. For example, the Second, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits view the time limitation as a
procedural limitation, but the Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits view it as a substantive
eligibility requirement See discussion infra Part III.
8. Martin L Budd, SecuritiesIndustry Arbitration -- Recent Issues 205, 208 (ALI-ABA Course
of Study No. 977, 1995).

9. Generally, customer agreements identify one (or more) of four arbitration fora to hear their
disputes. Marilyn B. Cane & Howard S. Weinstein, SecuritiesArbitration Update 1993-1994 387,407

(ALI-ABA Course of Study No. 903, 1994). Three of the four are SROs --the National Association
of Securities Dealers (NASD), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX) -- which are overseen and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Id. The fourth is the American Arbitration Association (AAA) which is an independent arbitral forum.

Id The AAA handles 8to 10% of the arbitration filings while the SROs handle the remaining filings.
Budd, supra note 8, at 207. Furthermore, NASD handles about 80% of the SROs' total caseload. Id
10. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 404.
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the same footing as other contracts"" when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act

(FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1-14 (1925).

2

The Supreme Court recognized Congress'

intent in AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America"

when the Court held that "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required 14to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit."'
Arbitration in the securities industry appears to have its beginnings in the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Constitution of 1817. This constitution
provided that: "All questions of dispute in the purchase of stocks shall be decided
by a majority of the Board."" In 1935, the Securities & Exchange Commission
stated in a release that "the Exchange should encourage its members to offer
customers a standard arbitration agreement...""6 Arbitration in the securities
industry continued to grow as other SROs provided arbitration services. For
example, NASD adopted its Code of Arbitration Procedure in 1968."

III. THE ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENT
SRO rules impose a time limit upon the arbitrability of securities disputes.'"
The NYSE, NASD, and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) rules all have a six-

11. H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., IstSess. 1 (1924).
12. Carroll E. Neesemann & Maren E. Nelson, The Law of SecuritiesArbitration,in SECURITIES
ARBITRATION 1995, at 135 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. 899, 1995). The
FAA embodies the federal government's policy of favoring arbitration where the parties have agreed
in writing to arbitrate disputes. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 405. In Volt Information Sciences,
Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1986), the Supreme Court
explained that the "Act was designed to overrule the judiciary's long standing refusal to enforce
agreements to arbitrate... and place such agreements upon the same footing as other contracts." Id.
at 474 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co, 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)). See Cane & Weinstein, supra
note 9, at 404.
13. 475 U.S. 643 (1986).
14. Id
15. Deborah Masucci & Robert S. Clemente, Securities Arbitration at the New York Stock
Exchange, Inc. andNationalAssociation of SecuritiesDealers,Inc. - AdministrationandProcedures,
in SECURITIES ARBrRATION 1995, at 291, 295 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series
No. 899, 1995).
16. Id. SEC Release No. 34-131 (1935).
17. Masucci & Clemente, supra note 15, at 295.
18. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 407. The "Securities Arbitration Rules" promulgated by
the AAA do not contain a time limitation for filing a claim for arbitration. Id. Instead, the AAA relies
on statutes of limitation. David E. Robbins, SecuritiesArbitrationProcedure and Case Evaluation,
401, 426 (ALI-ABA Course of Study No. 879, 1993). Therefore, because there is no possible dispute
over an eligibility requirement, it is not contested that the AAA arbitration panel may hear the claim
irrespective of when the events giving rise to the dispute occurred. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9,
at 407.
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year limitation.' 9 Because most securities arbitration agreements incorporate the
rules of the NYSE and/or the NASD,20 this Comment will refer to those rules.
Rule 603 of the NYSE and Section 15 of the NASD Code provide that:
No dispute, claim, or controversy shall be eligible for submission
to arbitration under this Code where six (6) years have elapsed
from the occurrence or event giving rise to the act or dispute,
claim or controversy. This section shall not extend applicable
statutes of limitations, nor shall it apply to any case which is
directed to arbitration by a court of competent jurisdiction.2'
This limitation has borne what appears to be the hottest topic of debate in
securities arbitration: Who decides the timeliness of a securities arbitration claim,
the court or the arbitrator? The Third, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits for
the Court of Appeals say the court decides the issue.22 The Second, Fifth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, say the arbitrator decides.23
Specifically, the issue is whether the time limitation acts as a substantive
eligibility requirement or a procedural limitation on arbitration. 4 If it acts as a
substantive eligibility requirement, the determination that a claim is untimely
would mean that the arbitrator does not have jurisdiction over the matter. This
lack of jurisdiction is based on the argument that the parties did not agree to
arbitrate disputes which arose over six years ago. 25 Therefore, if the claim does
not fall within this substantive limitation of the agreement, the arbitrator does not
have jurisdiction.26
If it is a procedural limitation, however, the arbitrator already has jurisdiction
the
matter. The limitation then acts as a statute of limitations of sorts with
over
the arbitrator deciding its applicability.2 The argument follows that because the
parties agreed to arbitrate these types of disputes, the time limitation is merely a
procedural limitation on the right of the cause of action, not on the arbitrator's

19. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 407.
The historical rationale of the six-year rule is that most of the records of a customer's
account maintained by the brokerage firm must be preserved for that period of time.
Requiring a firm to defend a claim which arose beyond that six-year period, it is argued,
could prejudice a firm because key records (e~g., monthly account statements,
confirmations, opening account forms) may no longer be available.
Robbins, supra note 18, at 426.
20. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 407.
21. Id.
22. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d 381 (11th Cir. 1995);
Roney & Co. v. Kassab, 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992); PaineWebber Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507
(3rd Cir. 1990); PaineWebber Inc. v. Farnan, 870 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
23. See Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v. Boone, 47 F.3d 750 (5th Cir. 1995); FSC Sec. Corp. v.
Freel, 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994); O'Neel v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 667 F.2d 804 (9th
Cir. 1982); Conticommodity Serv., Inc. v. Philipp, 613 F.2d 1222 (2nd Cir. 1980).
24. Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 510-12.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id
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were already
jurisdiction.28 Metaphorically speaking, it is as if "the parties
9
through the gate and within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator.0
This dispute is not so much legal as it is linguistic and interpretive in
nature." While both interpretations of the time limitation are plausible, this
author believes the better-reasoned interpretation is that the limitation is a
substantive eligibility requirement and timeliness is a matter for the court to
decide.

A. What the Courts Say
The roots of this debate within the federal courts of appeals can be traced
back to the early 1980s. In Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp,3 the
Second Circuit held that the arbitrator, not the court, is to determine the validity
of any time-barred defenses to enforcement of arbitration agreements.3 2 Two
aspects of the court's decision are weak. First, the court relied solely on the
language and policy considerations of the FAA without citing any Supreme Court
precedent. 3 Second, the court, without any legal analysis, merely asserted that
the time limitation was a procedural defense rather than a substantive eligibility
requirement.34
The basis for the court's decision was the language of Section 4 of the
Section 4 provides that when a party petitions a district court for an
FAA.
order directing arbitration, "[tihe court shall hear the parties, and upon being
satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to
proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement."3 6
The court felt that the language of Section 4 was "straightforward", stating
that "unless the 'making' of the agreement to arbitrate or 'the failure, neglect, or
refusal' of one party to arbitrate is in dispute, the court must compel

28. Id.
29. Id. at 512.
30. Id.
31. 613 F.2d 1222 (2nd Cir. 1980).
32. Id at 1225.
33. Id at 1224-26. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
34. Conticommodity Services, 613 F.2d at 1225. The Customer Agreement provided that the
arbitration of "(a)ny controversy... arising out of or relating to" the trading contract between the
parties was to commence within one year of the accrual of any such cause of action. Id at 1223. The
parties were also members of the Commodities Exchange Inc. (COMEX) and thus wer subject to its
rules. Id COMEX Rule 702 imposed a time limitation on arbitration which provided that "[a] party
desiring to initiate an arbitration proceeding, within one year of the date of the transaction or event
which gave rise to the claim or grievance, shall file .... Id COMEX was chosen as the arbitration
forum. Id at 1224.
35. Id at 1224-25.
36. Id at 1225.
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Therefore, the court reasoned, because the existence of an8
arbitration.""
arbitration agreement and the broker's refusal to arbitrate were both undisputed,
Section 4 required the district court "to send the dispute to arbitration, regardless
of the validity of any procedural defenses" such as timeliness.39
The court also relied upon policy considerations embodied in the FAA which
favor the enforcement of arbitration agreements.4' One such policy is that
"[alrbitration is intended to provide the parties to a dispute with a speedy and
relatively inexpensive trial before specialists." 4' Another policy is that arbitration
"eases the workload of the courts." 42 To avoid frustrating the policies embodied
in the Act, the court reasoned that the FAA "carefully limits the role of courts in
considering motions to compel arbitration.""
Although the general language of Section 4 offers a very plausible approach,
the Second Circuit failed to recognize Supreme Court precedent which has
clarified Section 4 of the FAA. In the Steelworkers Trilogy cases, the Supreme
Court held that (1) "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to
submit"; (2) "arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes 'solely from the
parties' agreement to submit their grievances to arbitration"; and (3) "unless the
parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the question of whether the
parties agreed to arbitrate [a particular grievance] is to be decided by the court, not
the arbitrator."" Commentators agree that the Court's holdings in these cases are
in accord with the FAA.43
Based on the above cases, the author believes that the proper reasoning is as
follows: By incorporating the SRO rules into their arbitration agreement, the
parties agreed to arbitrate only those disputes that are brought to arbitration within
six years of the date of the occurrence or event giving rise to the dispute. Because
the determination of whether this six-year period has elapsed affects whether the
parties have a duty to arbitrate, the court must make that determination.
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit in O 'Neel v. NationalAssociation of Securities
Dealers, Inc. 6 adopted the rule set forth by the Second Circuit in
Conticommodity Services.47 The rule in Conticommodity Services provided that

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1224.
41. Id
42. Id
43. Id
44. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Wanior & GulfNavigation, 363
U.S. 574, 582 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See
AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citing
Gateway Coal Co. v. Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368, 374 (1974)).
45. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 405.
46. 667 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. Id at 807.
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the arbitrator,
not the court, should determine "the validity of time-barred
48
defenses."
In 1989, the Seventh Circuit in PaineWebberInc. v. Farnam49 declared that
the court, not the arbitrator, decides the timeliness of the claim. 50 Looking at the
language of Section 15 of the NASD Code, the Seventh Circuit found that on
Section 15's face it stated that it was an eligibility requirement, not a statute of
limitations.5' The court then pointed to a letter written by a NASD Staff
Attorney which stated that "the NASD will not process a claim that falls wholly
outside the six year period. 52 Based on these findings, the court held that
Section 15 served "as an absolute bar to claims submitted for arbitration more than
six years after the event which gave rise to the dispute."53
Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit offered a more in-depth analysis of this
issue in its 1992 decision in Edward D. Jones & Co. v. Sorrells.54 The court

began by restating its previous holding that Section 15 is an eligibility requirement
that bars certain claims from arbitration." The court reasoned that because
Section 15 limits the range of disputes the parties contractually
agreed to arbitrate,
56
Section 15 also limits the jurisdiction of NASD arbitrators.
The Seventh Circuit then cited the Supreme Court's holding in AT&T
Technologies which states that defining the limits of arbitral jurisdiction is
generally the function of courts, not arbitrators "unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise."" Finding that the claimants had not pointed
to any evidence in the record demonstrating that the parties intended the arbitrators
to define their own jurisdiction, the court held that the court must decide the
arbitral jurisdiction in that case.5"
Finally, in a footnote, the court addressed Section 35 of the NASD Code.59
Section 35 provides that the "arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret and
determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code which interpretation
shall be final and binding upon the parties.""' Although the opinion offers no
argument relating to the application of Section 35, the court did state that the
language of Section 35 was not "a clear and unmistakable expression of the

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
870 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id
Id.
957 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 512.
Id at 514.
Id

58. Id.
59. Id n.6.
60. Id.
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parties' intent" to have the
arbitrator determine which disputes the parties agreed
6
to submit to arbitration. 1

The Third Circuit provided the most impressive analysis of this issue in
PaineWebberInc. v. Hartmann.62 The court began by noting that the general

language of Section 4 of the FAA "fails to delineate with precision the scope of
'
The court
the district court's jurisdiction in an action to compel arbitration."63

did recognize, however, that the limits of the court's jurisdiction had been
addressed and clarified by case law. 6'
Focusing on the language of Section 4, the court found that "[ain 'issue'
requiring resolution by the district court arises under Section 4 only when the
party refusing to arbitrate contends that the dispute is not one that the parties
agreed to arbitrate."65 The court then pointed to the Supreme Court's holding in
AT&T Technologies in which the Court stated that "as a matter of contract,
no
66
party can be forced to arbitrate unless that party has [agreed to do so]."
Based on the language of Section 4 and the Supreme Court's holding in
AT&T Technologies,the court reasoned that Section 4 requires the court to engage
in a limited review of the arbitration agreement to ensure (1) that a valid
agreement to arbitrate exists, and (2) that the dispute falls within the substantive
scope of that agreement.6' Because the parties did not dispute the existence of
a valid agreement to arbitrate, the court found that the sole issue was whether
the
6
matter in dispute fell outside the substantive scope of the agreement. 8
Next, the court addressed the question of whether the time limitation was a
substantive eligibility requirement or a procedural requirement. 9 The court
recognized that the latter interpretation was plausible and that precedent existed
which supported that view. ° The court stated, however, that it must recognize
the underlying concem that the Supreme Court articulated in AT&T Technologies:
"The willingness of parties to enter into agreements that provide for arbitration of

61. Id (citing AT&T Technologies Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 649
(1996)).
62. 921 F.2d 507 (3rd Cir. 1990).
63. Id. at 510.
64. Id. at 510-11.
65. Id. at 511.
66. Id
67. Id. The court noted that:
[like any contract, an agreement to arbitrate may be limited in its substantive scope in
an almost infinite variety of ways. Obvious examples include limitations as to the parties
and the types of disputes covered by the agreement . ..Similarly, as numerous courts
have recognized, parties to an arbitration agreement might substantively limit their
obligation to arbitrate in a temporal sense.
Id
68. Id
69. Id.at 512.
70. Id
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specified disputes would be 'drastically reduced' [if the arbitrator] had the 'power
to determine his own jurisdiction ....
Recognizing that resolution of the issue was based solely on linguistics and
interpretation, the court turned to the language of Rule 603 72 The court looked
to Webster's Third New International Dictionary for the definitions of "eligible"
and "submission."73 Inserting these definitions into the text of Rule 603, the
court came up with the following: "[A]fter six years, a dispute 'shall [not] be
worthy to be chosen or selected for [the] consideration, study, or decision [of]
arbitration."' 74 The court concluded that this expanded reading of Rule 603
unambiguously supported the interpretation that it is a substantive eligibility
requirement."
In 1992, the Sixth Circuit in Roney & Co. v. Kassab76 adopted the Third
77
Circuit's position in Hartmann that the district court should decide timeliness.
In 1994, however, the Eighth Circuit in FSC Securities Corp. v. Freer'
decided to break from the growing consensus. The court found that the arbitrator,
not the court, is to determine timeliness.79 In its ruling, however, the court did
not even address Section 15 of the NASD Code.8 ° Instead, the court focused
solely on the language of Section 35 of the NASD Code."1 The court found that
the language of Section 35, which committed the interpretation of all provisions
of the NASD Code to the arbitrator, represented the "clear and unmistakable"

71. Id. at 511-12. The court cited the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia's reasoning
that:
if we allow the federal policy favoring arbitration, with its accompanying presumption of
arbitrability, to override the will of the parties by giving the arbitration clause greater
coverage than the parties intended, then in the longer run we risk undermining rather than
serving that policy.... [Pirivate parties may be reluctant to agree to arbitration if they
believe that, despite their best efforts to express their wishes to the contrary, any slight
ambiguity in their words or deeds can be seized upon to extend their obligation to
arbitrate beyond the term of their contct. Therefore, mindful as we are of the federal
policy in favor of arbitration, it is our task nonetheless to determine what appears to be
most consistent with the intent of the parties.
Id. (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 760-61 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
72. Id. at 511, 513.
73. See Id "Eligible" is defined as "fitted or qualified to be chosen or used" or "worthy to be
chosen or selected." Id. at 513 (citing WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 736
(1966)). "Submission" is defined as the act of "commit[ting something] for consideration, study, or
decision." Id. (citing WEBsuss TIR NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcnoNARY 2277 (1966)).
74. Id.
75. Id
76. 981 F.2d 894 (6th Cir. 1992).
77. Id.at 897.
78. 14 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1994).
79. Id. at 1311-13.
80. Id
81. Id
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intent by the parties adopting the Code to have the arbitrator determine
arbitrability under Section 15 .'
The Eight Circuit's interpretation cannot stand as it is arguable whether the
language of Section 35 represents the "clear and unmistakable" intent of the parties
that the arbitrator determine eligibility under Section 15. The Seventh Circuit in
Sorrells and the Third Circuit in Paine Webber Inc. v. Hofinann'3 held that

Section 35 was not a clear and unmistakable expression of the parties' intent to
have the arbitrators, not the court, determine which disputes the parties agreed to
submit to arbitration.'
Looking at the language of Section 35, the arbitrator is empowered to
interpret 5 and determine the applicabilit 6 of all provisions under the Code.
A reasonable interpretation of this language seems to be that Section 35 merely
gives the arbitrator final say with regard to the meaning of provisions and whether
they apply to the situation at hand.
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of Section35 goes againstthe
policy consideration espoused by the Supreme Court to ensure that the parties'
intent is not undermined. In AT&T Technologies, the Supreme Court was
concerned that "[tihe willingness of parties to enter into agreements that provide
for arbitration of specified disputes would be 'drastically reduced' [if the
arbitrator] had the 'power to determine his own jurisdiction .... ,""
In 1995, the Fifth Circuit, without addressing the provisions of the SRO
Codes, relied on its holdings in prior non-securities cases that "a question of
timeliness is generally to be considered one of procedural arbitrability. '
In that same year, the Eleventh Circuit joined the Third, Sixth and Seventh
Circuits in finding that Section 15 of the NASD Code is a substantive eligibility
requirement. ' The Eleventh Circuit noted that the plain language of Section 15
supported the conclusion that it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to arbitration.9 °
With regard to Section 35, the Eleventh Circuit pointed to the recent Supreme
Court case, First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan.9

In Kaplan, the Court

reiterated that the presumption in favor of arbitration is not applicable to the issue
of who decides arbitrability: "Courts should not assume that the parties agreed to
arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e] evidence that they

82. Id. at 1312-13. Section 35 provides that, "[tjhe arbitrators shall be empowered to interpret
and determine the applicability of all provisions under this Code which interpretation shall be final and
binding upon the parties." Id. at 1312.
83. 984 F.2d 1372 (3rd Cir. 1993).
84. See Sorrells, 957 F.2d at 514 n.6; Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1379 n.4.
85. "Interpret" is defined as to "explain or tell the meaning of." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLECATE DICTIONARY 632-33 (1988).
86. "Applicability" is defined as "capable of or suitable for being applied, appropriate." Id at 97.
87. Hartmann, 921 F.2d at 511-12.
88. Boone, 47 F.3d at 754.
89. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 383.
90. Id at 384.
91. 115 S. CL 1920 (1995).
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did so."'" The Eleventh Circuit found that Section 35 was not "clear and
unmistakable evidence of the parties' intent to allow the arbitrator to determine the
timeliness of the claim."93 The Eleventh Circuit noted that "Section 35 is a
general contract term which gives the arbitrator the power to interpret the NASD
Code," and, by contrast, section 15 "is a specific provision, which delineates the
'
The Eleventh Circuit
claims that are untimely, and not eligible for arbitration."94

also noted that "when general positions in a contract are qualified by specific
provisions, the rule of construction is that the specific provisions in the agreement
' Therefore, the court concluded that "at most Section 35 creat[ed] an
control."95
is
ambiguity as to who determines arbitrability" and that "[a]n ambiguity
96
insufficient to override the presumption that courts determine arbitrability.
B. Sub-Issues
1. What is the "occurrence or event" triggering the
start of the time limitation for arbitrability?
At least one court of appeals clearly holds that the "occurrence or event"
triggering the running of the time limitation for arbitrability is always the purchase
date of the investment.' Two courts of appeals, however, have held that the
"occurrence or event" does not have to be the purchase date of the investment,9
rather, it can be the wrongdoing giving rise to a cause of action.99
The Seventh Circuit clearly holds that the purchase date of the investment
starts the running of the time limitation for eligibility."° In Sorrells,the Sorrells
alleged that their formerbroker and brokerage firm (1)fraudulently misrepresented
material information as to the nature of their investment; (2) violated federal
securities laws, federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statutes,
and the Rules of NASD and NYSE, (3) fraudulently concealed wrongdoing; and
(4) the firm improperly supervised its broker.'0 ' Despite these allegations, the

Seventh Circuit held that the Sorrells' claims were ineligible for arbitration under

92. Id at 1921 (citing AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 649).
93. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 384.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. EdwardD. Jones & Co., 957 F.2d at 512-13. Although less clear, the Sixth Circuit also may
view the purchase date as the beginning of the time limitation. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy,
70 F.3d 1271, 1272 (6th Cir. 1995).
98. See Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1379-80; Cohen, 62 F.3d at 385.
99. Id
100. Sorrells, 957 F.2d at 512-13.
101. Id. at 510, 512.
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Section 15 of the NASD Code because more than six years had elapsed from the
date they purchased their last investment."re
The Sixth Circuit may also view the purchase date as the start of the time
limitation; however, it is not certain. In Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy

on remand, a district court in the Sixth Circuit,
(hereinafter McCoy I1),
quoting Sorrells, held that the "date of the 'occurrence or event' giving rise to the
act or dispute, claim or controversy," for purposes of Section 15, is the date of the
investment.'0 4
In McCoy I, °' the claimants alleged that their broker made risky
investments in order to reap excessive fees and commissions." ° The claimants
argued that the "occurence or event" giving rise to their claim was when their
investments turned sour, not when they made their investments. 0 7
On appeal from McCoy II, the Sixth Circuit for the Court of Appeals in
McCoy 1i1i08 reasoned that "the injury [the claimants] complain of occurred
when the investments were first made. Consequently, the Investors' claim arose
and the1 °9six-year time limit began to run at the time the investments were
made.
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that adopting the claimants' allegation that the
"occurrence or event" arose when their investments turned sour, rather than when
they were made, "would clearly undermine the intention of Section 15 calling for
a six-year time limit on the arbitrability of claims, and "would enable the Investors
to control the running of the time limit while they reaped
the benefits of the
0
investments about which they would later complain.""1
Throughout its opinion, however, the Sixth Circuit never stated that it was
affimning the district court's finding that, for purposes of Section 15 of the NASD
Code, the purchase date is the relevant "occurrence or event" that triggers the

102. Id. at 512-13. The true issue in this case was whether Section 15 of the NASD Code could
be tolled for equitable considerations. Id. The Sorells alleged that the broker and brokerage firm
fraudulently concealed the wrongdoing thus making it impossible for them to discover their injury until
six years from the purchase date of the investment had run. Id Therefore, the Sorrells contended, the
doctrine of equitable tolling suspended the running of the limitations period until they discovered the
wrongdoing. Id. The Seventh Circuit, therefore, analyzed the issue from the standpoint of the doctrine
of equitable tolling. Id. Nevertheless, the court held that, because "[miore than six years elapsed from
the date the Sorrells made the last of the ten investments which gave rise to their claims ... the
Sorrells' arbitration claims were not timely filed under Section 15." Id
103. 853 F.Supp. 1023 (E.D. Tenn. 1994).
104. Id at 1030.
105. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, 995 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1993) (hereinafter McCoy 1).
106. Id at 650.
107. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, No. 94-5779, 1995 WL 699619, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.
27, 1995).
108. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. McCoy, No. 94-5779, 1995 WL 699619 (6th Cir. Nov. 27,
1995) (hereinafter McCoy Ill).
109. Id at *2.
110. Id
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running of the time limitation."'

Also, from the language used by the Sixth

Circuit, it could be argued that the court merely held that a claim of unsuitable
securities investment necessarily arose at the time the investment was purchased.

The Third Circuit, however, holds that the "occurrence or event" from which
the claim arises and which triggers the running of the time limitation is not

necessarily the purchase date of the investment." 2 In Hofmann, Hofmann
alleged the "occurrences or events" giving rise to his claims were (1)the giving

of wrongful advice, (2) the active concealment of wrongdoing, (3) the discovery

of wrongdoing, and (4) the continuation of wrongdoing." 3 The Third Circuit
remanded the case back to the district court to determine whether the claims arose

from "occurrences or 4events" within the six-year period provided by Section 15
of the NASD Code."
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen,'

the Eleventh

Circuit appeared to adopt the approach advocated by the Third Circuit in
Hofmann. "6 Quoting the Third Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held that it was not
a "foregone conclusion" that the time period for arbitrability runs from the date
the investment is purchased."

7

The court noted that Section 15 of the NASD

111. Id.
112. Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1379-80.
113. Id. at 1380. Specifically, the customer claimed that the following events or occurrences
occurred within the six-year period provided for in Section 15 of the NASD Code: (1) the
stockbroker's advice to "hold" all stock - each time this advice was given being an actionable
occurrence; (2) the brokerage firm's active concealment of the stockbroker's wrongdoing and of the
undue speculative nature of the customer's portfolio -- the concealment being an independent,
actionable wrong; (3) the customer's discovery of the brokerage fimn's and the stockbroker's
wrongdoing -- the date of discovery being the first date on which the customer could prevent further
injury; (4) the continuation of an integrated pattern of wrongdoing -- the fraudulent inducement to buy
and hold the stock over the period from 1982 through 1991 constituting a single, ongoing wrong; and
(5) the continuation of a wrongful brokerage relationship -- the entire brokerage relationship being so
tainted with fraud and mismanagement that the relationship itself constitutes a single, actionable wrong.
Id.
Also, the Third Circuit noted that if it is unclear on the record how the parties intended to
resolve disputes over the meaning of "occurrence or event," then the first step is to determine whether
the parties intended to submit disputes over the operative occurrence or event to arbitration. Id at
1382. If the court finds that the parties intended to submit such disputes to arbitration, the question
of what constitutes the relevant occurrence or event (and/or when such occurrence or event took place)
should be sent to an arbitrator for initial determination. Id at 1382-83. If the arbitrator finds that the
occurrence or event which gave rise to the particular claim occurred more than six years before the
filing of arbitration, the arbitrator no longer has jurisdiction and his or her inquiry as to that claim is
at an end. Id at 1383. If the arbitrator, however, finds that the occurrence or event transpired within
the six-year period before the filing of an arbitration demand, the arbitrator is to rule on the merits of
the claim. Id. On the other hand, if the district court found that the parties did not intend to submit
disputes over the relevant occurrence or event to arbitration, the court is to determine what the relevant
occurrence or event is (and/or when it took place). Id.
114. Id at 1380.
115. 62 F.3d 381 (lth Cir. 1995).
116. Id at 385.
117. Id

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996

13

Journal of Dispute
Resolution, Vol.
1996, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. [Vol.
4
1996, No. 2
JOURNAL
OF DISPUTE
RESOLUTION

Code did not define relative "occurrence or event" as the purchase of the
investment. s Based on these findings, the court remanded the case back to the
district court with instructions to determine what the relevant "occurrences or
events" were." 9 In a footnote, the court used the Cohens' claim for breach of

fiduciary duty to illustrate that if such a duty existed, each misrepresentation might
be an "occurrence or event."' 20 If, however, the Cohens' claim was predicated
solely on the unsuitability of their purchase, the relevant "occurrence or event"
might be the underlying investment. ''
Supporting the view of the Third and Eleventh Circuits, the NASD Director
of Arbitration in a 1991 letter expressed that the time period for arbitrability may
begin to run upon the discovery of losses. 122 Specifically, the letter stated:
It has been determined that the purchase date is not the event or
occurrence that gave rise to this dispute. Also, Section 15 does not
refer specifically to the purchase date as the time the six-year limitation
begins to run. Therefore, it is equally appropriate that the discovery by
the claimant
be treated -as the occurrence or event giving rise to the
23
dispute."
The better-reasoned approach appears to be the one adopted by the Third and
Eleventh Circuits. Their approach is supported by the following facts: (1) no
provision in the NASD Code defines "occurrence or event," (2) the Director of
Arbitration of the NASD has stated that the time limitation does not have to run
from the purchase date, and (3) the wrongdoing may not occur within six years
of the purchase date of the investment.
Despite these facts, the Seventh Circuit's approach appears to be equally
well-reasoned in light of the historical rationale behind the choice of a six-year
limitation. The historical rationale bases the six-year time limit on the
requirement that most records24of a customer's account must be preserved by the
brokerage firm for six years.'
2. May the claim be brought in court, after the time
limit for arbitration has run, if the legal
statute of limitations on the claim has not run?
When addressing this issue, one court of appeals and several district courts
have found that the answer lies in the language of the individual customer
agreement.

118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. n.7.
121. Id.
122. Quinton F. Seamons, Does Securities Arbitration Go on Forever? Eligibility and Statutes
of Limitation, INSIGHs, May 1994, at 17, 19.
123. Id.
124. See Robbins, supra note 18, at 426.
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In Piccolo v. Faragalli& PaineWebber,Inc.,125 the court focused on the
language in the customer agreement which stated that all controversies between the
parties must be determined by arbitration. 26 The court's focus on this language
is especially significant in light of the fact that the customer agreement
incorporated by reference Section 15 of the NASD Code and Rule 603 of the
127
NYSE Rules.
With this focus, the court found that there was "simply no language anywhere
in the Client's Agreement which stated] that plaintiff may seek relief in federal
district court once it has been determined that his claims are not eligible for
arbitration.""l2s The court reasoned that "for us to find that plaintiff could assert
his claims in this forum after having been time-barred from asserting them in
arbitration, would only encourage a plaintiff seeking to avoid
arbitration to wait
1 29
six years and then assert his claims in federal district court.
Citing Piccolo, the district court in McCoy II looked to the terms of the
customer agreement. From that angle, the court found that the plain language used
by the parties clearly stated that it was the intent of the parties that all disputes
3
would be resolved through arbitration rather than litigation in the courts.1 0
Based on this plain language, the court concluded that the parties, by contract,
waived their right to litigate their claims3 2 in court.' 31 On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
Two district courts have implied that claims ineligible for arbitration may be
pursued in court. 33 The holdings in these cases, however, have been

distinguished.
In PrudentialSecurities,Inc. v. LaPlant,34 the court flatly held that claims
which were ineligible for arbitration because more than six years had passed could
still be litigated in federal district court. 35 The court in Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shelapinsky,136 however, declined to follow the decision

125. No. CIV.A.93-2758, 1993 WL 331933 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 1993).
126. Id at *1.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See Id. See also Calabria v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 855 F.Supp. 172
(N.D. Tex. 1994); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Shelapinsky, No. CIV.A.93-1553,
1994 WL 397123 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994); Castellano v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., No. CIV.A.901287, 1990 WL 87575 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1990).
130. McCoy II, 853 F. Supp. at 1033. Specifically, the parties "agreed that any controversy
arising out of or relating to the contract or the breach thereof 'shall be settled by arbitration' and the
arbitrators' decision shall be final." Id
131. Id
132. McCoy III, 1995 WL 699619, at *2.
133., See Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. St. Pierre, No. 92-C5735, 1994 WL 11600
(N.D. Il. Jan. 4, 1994); Prudential Sec., Inc. v. LaPlant, 829 F.Supp. 1239 (D. Kan. 1993).
134. 829 F.Supp. 1239 (D. Kan. 1993).
135. Id at 1244.
136. No. CIV.A.93-1553, 1994 WL 397123 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 1994).
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in LaPlant."' Because the court in LaPlant did not discuss the provisions
contained in the customer agreement, the Shelapinsky court found that "the issue
of whether claims that were ineligible for arbitration could be brought in federal
district court was never decided [in LaPlant]. Rather, it was assumed that the
claims could proceed.' 38 The Shelapinsky court found that the claimant in
LaPlant was requesting that stale claims be arbitrated along with the eligible
claims to avoid claim splitting.3 9 Whether the stale claims could be litigated
in federal court was not even an issue in LaPlant 40
41
The district court in Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co. v. St. Pierre,1
in determining whether the brokerage firm met the requisite proof for an
injunction, noted that "[b]arring [the claimants] from arbitrating their claims does
not bar [them] from proceeding through a proper court."' 42 This decision,
however, has also been distinguished. In Calabriav. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,' the court observed that the district court in St. Pierre

was interpreting and applying NYSE Rules 600(a) and 603, rather than the
provisions in the customer agreement.'
Also, the court noted that the St.
Pierrecourt, like the court in LaPlant, did not decide the precise issue of whether
claims made ineligible for arbitration could be brought in court. 4 Rather,
the
46
St. Pierre court, like LaPlant, merely presumed they could proceed.
3. May the time limitation be tolled by equitable considerations?
When interpreted as a substantive eligibility requirement, the SROs' time
limitation is often analogized to a statute of repose. 47 A statute of repose
"limits potential liability by limiting [the] time during which [a] cause of action
can arise. ' Therefore, when the claimant discovers the wrong plays no role
in a statute of repose.
When interpreted as a procedural limitation, however, the limitation is often
analogized to a statute of limitations. 149 A statute of limitations "bars [the] right

137. See Id. at *4.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. No. 92-C5735, 1994 WL 11600 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 1994).
142. Id. at *4.
143. 855 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Tex. June 17, 1994).
144. Id at 176.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Cane and Weinstein, supra note 9, at 408.
148. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICToNARY 1141 (6th ed. 1990); Kline v. J.L Case Co., 520 F.
Supp. 564, 567 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
149. Id.
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of action unless it is filed within a specified period of time after injury
occurs.""' Therefore, a statute of limitations allows the time limit for the
bringing of the action to toll until the wrong is discovered.' 5'
Not surprisingly, the Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, which hold that
the time limitation for arbitration is a substantive eligibility requirement, also hold
that the time limitation is not subject to tolling. For example, in Hofinann, the
Third Circuit reasoned that
[a]llowing 'claims' that are tolling or discovery arguments would permit a
party to circumvent the contractual limitation of Section 15 (of the NASD
Code) and thereby force a party to arbitrate a claim it never agreed to submit
to arbitration. The court therefore must enjoin the arbitration of such claims
in order to give full effect to the contract.'
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Farnam and the Eleventh Circuit in Cohen
agreed that since the time limitation is a substantive eligibility requirement rather
than a procedural statute of limitations, equitable tolling is not available.'
An interesting question, however, exists with regard to the Sixth Circuit's
position on equitable tolling. Even though the Sixth Circuit holds that the time
eligibility requirement, 5 4 it has held
limitation for arbitrability is a substantive
55
repose.
of
statute
that it is not a
The Sixth Circuit has managed to avoid ruling on the issue of tolling the time
limitation for arbitrability. For example, in McCoy III, claimants alleged that the
running of the time limitation for arbitrability did not begin until their discovery
The alleged wrongdoing was the
of the brokerage firm's wrongdoing.'
investment by the brokerage firm in risky investments to reap excessive fees and
commissions. ' Claimants contended that the brokerage firm inhibited the
58
claimants' discovery of the injury by fraudulently concealing its wrongdoing.
The court held that the issue of equitable tolling did not have to be reached

150. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (6th ed. 1990); Hanson v. Williams County, 389

N.W.2d 319, 321 (N.D. 1986)).
151. Id.
152. Hofmann, 984 F.2d at 1381. The Third Circuit also cleared up any confusion regarding
whether the customer's claims amount to a single, aggregated, indivisible claim. The district court in
Hofmann held that, because one of the customer's claims fell outside the six-year period, all of his
claims fell outside the period. Id. at 1377. The court of appeals, however, held that that analysis was
flawed. Id. Actually, the dispute was comprised of a number of distinct claims any one of which
could fall inside the six-year period and, therefore, be subject to arbitration, even if all of the other
claims fell outside of the period. Id. at 1377, 1380. The Third Circuit also pointed to the fact that the
Seventh Circuit treated such claims in the same manner. Id at 1377.
153. Paine Webber Inc. v. Famam, 870 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir. 1989); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cohen, 62 F.3di 281, 385 n.4.
154. Roney, 981 F.2d at 897.
155. McCoy I, 995 F.2d at 651.

156. McCoy III, 1995 WL 699619, at *2.
157. McCoy 1, 995 F.2d at 650.
158. McCoy I1, 1995 WL 699619, at *2.
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because the claimants provided no evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of
fact material as to their claim of fraudulent concealment.'59
McCoy II was the Sixth Circuit's most recent decision on the issue of
equitable tolling and was before the Sixth Circuit twice. The first time the court
remanded the case back to the district court and instructed the district court that
if it finds that the brokerage firm or its agents fraudulently concealed the alleged
The Sixth
wrongs, the claims could potentially be pursued in arbitration. 160
61
Circuit also noted that Kassab should be looked to for guidance.1
On remand, the district court looked at Kassab and found that it did not
address the question of whether the time limitation for arbitrability may be tolled
on the ground of fraudulent concealment.' 62 In Kassab, the claimants did not
argue that the time limitation should be tolled on the ground of fraudulent
concealment.' 63 Rather, they contended that the brokerage firm had engaged in
separate acts of wrongful conduct by fraudulently concealing the injuries to the
claimants and that such wrongful conduct, in and of itself, was eligible for
arbitration because it occurred within the six-year time limit.' 6 The Sixth
the claimants failed to state a sufficient
Circuit in Kassab, however, ruled 6that
5
claim for fraudulent concealment.1
The district court interpreted Kassab to mean that the issue of equitable
tolling was still an open question and it considered the Sixth Circuit's statement
in McCoy I to be dicta.' 66 Therefore, the district court approached the issue of
equitable tolling as one of first impression in the Sixth Circuit.' 67
Citing the Third and Seventh Circuits, the district court held that "since
Section 15 is an eligibility or jurisdictional requirement rather than a statute of
limitations, it is not subject to equitable tolling on the ground of fraudulent
concealment."'" The district court stated that it was convinced, in light of the
Sixth Circuit's analysis in Kassab, that if the Sixth Circuit was confronted with
the issae of equitable tolling, it would choose to follow the decisions of the Third
and Seventh Circuits. 69 In its decision, the district court reasoned that
[i]f the Court were to hold that the defendants' claims are eligible for
arbitration beyond the six-year time limit provided in Section 15 based
on theories of equitable tolling and discovery, it would permit
defendants to breach and circumvent the contractual time limit they
agreed to in Section 15 of the NASD Code thereby forcing [the other

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id
McCoy I,995 F.2d at 651.
Id.
McCoy I, 853 F. Supp. at 1029.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 1031.
Id
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party] to arbitrate stale claims it never agreed to submit to
arbitration.17°
However, as noted above, when McCoy I reached the Court of Appeals, the
Sixth Circuit held that it need not reach the issue of equitable tolling at that
time.171
With regard to the issue of SROs' time limitation versus a longer state statute
of limitations and equitable tolling, unjust results appear inevitable from the courts
viewing the time limitation as a substantive eligibility requirement. These courts
take a strong contractual stance with regard to arbitration clauses. This contractual
stance dictates that parties who incorporate arbitration clauses in their agreements
opt out of the rules prescribed by the legislature and the courts.
Courts that view the time limitation as a statute of limitations of sorts believe
equitable considerations are alive and well in the arbitral fora.
Both sides of the debate are, once again, very plausible. The strong
contractual stance is supported by Supreme Court precedent, the FAA's underlying
goal to place arbitration agreements "upon the same footing as other
and by the historical rationale of the general six-year time
contracts, ''1 "72
73

limitation.
Allowing one to fraudulently conceal wrongdoing long enough to avoid
arbitration, however, is not a just result. It also seems unjust to completely
preclude parties who "chose" to arbitrate because an arbitration provision was
contained in their standardized customer agreement from the court system and
equitable considerations.
4. May arbitration be stayed if the legal
statute of limitations on the claim has run?
This issue has been addressedby the Ninth Circuit for the Court of Appeals,
two district courts of the Sixth Circuit, and by the state of New York.
In the Ninth Circuit case, O'Neel, a dissatisfied customer filed a notice of
claim in arbitration against her brokerage firm 1 74 The firm then filed a thirdparty claim against O'Neel, an account executive at the firm, for any damages that
might be awarded.' 75 O'Neel claimed the arbitration panel had no jurisdiction

over the claim since the legal statute of limitations on the claim had run.'76 The
Ninth Circuit, however, held that the statute of limitations defense did not go to
the jurisdiction of the arbitration panel.' 77

170. Id
171. McCoy l, 1995 WL 699619, at *2.
172. Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
474 (1986) (citing Scheik v. Aiberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974)).
173. See Robbins, supra note 18, at 426. See also supra text accompanying note 19.
174. 0'NeW, 667 F.2d at 806.
175. Id
176. Id
177. Id at 807.
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The Ninth Circuit's approach appears to be consistent with the view of the
"substantive eligibility" courts that the parties to an arbitration agreement
contracted out of the rules prescribed by the legislature and the courts.
In Davis v. Skarnulis,78 a district court in the Sixth Circuit had to decide
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the issue of statutes of limitation when they
agreed to arbitrate under the NASD rules.' 79 The district court interpreted the

second sentence of Section 15 of the NASD Code as "intend[ing] to set forth the
agreement of the parties that the arbitrators shall be bound to abide by the state
and federal statutes of limitation in adjudicating the disputes."' 0 Therefore, the
court compelled the parties to arbitrate the applicability of the state and federal
statutes of limitation to the claims. 18'
In McCoy II, another Sixth Circuit district court held that:
[a]lthough a claim may be eligible for arbitration under the first
sentence of Section 15 where it has been brought within the six-year
eligibility time limit, the claim may ultimately be dismissed by the
arbitrators as being time-barred by the applicable state or federal statute
of limitations.'
Although McCoy I was appealled to the court of appeals, that court did not rule
on this specific issue."
Finally, New York statutory law provides that the court may stay arbitration
proceedings if the claim to be arbitrated would be barred by the state law statute

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

827 F. Supp. 1305 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
Id at 1307.
Id. at 1308.
Id. at 1309.
McCoy II, 853 F. Supp. at 1031 (citing Davis, 827 F. Supp. at 1308).
McCoy D7, 1995 WL 699619, at *4.
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of limitations.'84 It should be noted that most customer agreements containing
arbitration clauses provide that New York law applies.' 85
In Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 186 the parties'

arbitration agreementprovided that any controversy arising from the contract shall
be (1) settled by arbitration and (2) governed by the New York choice of law

clause.' 87 The petitioners commenced proceedings in the New York courts to
permanently stay arbitration pursuant to the New York statute of limitations."
The New York Court of Appeals held that:

the parties' choice that New York law would govern 'the agreement and its
enforcement' indicates their 'intention to arbitrate to the extent allowed by
[this State's] law,' even if application of the State law -- and an adverse
ruling on a Statute of Limitations claim -- would relieve the parties of their
responsibility under the contract to arbitrate.'8 9

184. Two sparate sections of New York statutory law are relevant to the issue of arbitration and
statute of limitations. See Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., Inc. v. Luckie, 85 N.Y.S.2d 193, 204
(N.Y. 1995).
First, N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L & R. 7502(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997), entitled "Limitation of time,"
provides:
If, at the time that a demand for arbitration was made or a notice of intention to arbitrate
was served, the claim sought to be arbitrated would have been barred by limitation of
time had it been asserted in a court of the state, a party may assert the limitation as a bar
The failure to assert such bar by
to the arbitration on an application to the court ....
such application shall not preclude its assertion before the arbitrators, who may, in their
sole discretion, apply or not apply the bar.
Second, N.Y. CIV. PRAc. L & R 7503(a) (McKinney 1980), entitled "Application to compel
arbitration; stay of action," provides:
A party aggrieved by the failure of another to arbitrate may apply for an order compelling
arbitration. Where there is no substantial question whether a valid agreement was made
or complied with, and the claim sought to be arbitrated is not barred by limitation under
subdivision (b) of section 7502, the court shall direct the parties to arbitrate. Where any
such question is raised, it shall be tried forthwith in said court. If an issue claimed to be
arbitrable is involved in an action pending in a court having jurisdiction to hear a motion
to compel arbitration, the application shall be made by motion in that action. If the
application is granted, the order shall operate to stay a pending or subsequent action, or
so much of it as is referable to arbitration.
185. Budd, supra note 8, at 209 and accompanying text.
186. 647 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1995).
187. Id. at 1311.
188. Id.
189. Id at 202. The real issue before the court was:
whether, under standard Federal preemption analysis, the FAA's compulsory arbitration
provisions and its underlying policies require that even those questions normally reserved
to the courts pursuant to New York law must be resolved by the arbitrators,
notwithstanding the presence of a New York choice of law provision in the agreement to
arbitrate.
Id. at 203. The court held that it did not Id. at 204.
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5. Can a claimant effect an end-run around Section 15
by taking the claim to court and asking the court
to send the case to arbitration?
In Sorrells, the Seventh Circuit noted that "Section 15's bar on all claims
older than six years is removed only if a court with jurisdiction over the claim
orders the matter be submitted to arbitration.""9 ' This exception to Section 15's
time limitation for arbitrability was inapplicableto the Sorrells' claims becausethe
Sorrells submitted their "ineligible" claims to NASD arbitration instead of a
191

court.

This "exception" to the time limitation has some claimants attempting an endrun around the time limitation by filing their claims in court, thus expecting their
claims to be compelled to arbitration." 2 As one commentator noted, this endrun exception should be seriously considered by claimants' counsel because "[ijf
and
the court is faced with simultaneously denying a motion to compel1 arbitration
93
tossing the plaintiff out of court, it seems less likely to do both.

V.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 15 OF THE

NASD

CODE

InJuly 1994, hope for a resolution of the debate among the circuits emerged
when NASD announced its proposal to amend Section 15 of the Code.1 94 In
withdrew its proposal to amend the Code in order
October 1994, however, NASD
95
further.
issue
the
consider
to
The proposed amendments affected the following issues:
Substantive Eligibility Requirement or Procedural Limitation?
The proposed amendment changed the title of Section 15 from "Time
Limitation on Submission" to "Eligibility." This change would have dispelled any
rule is anything other than a substantive eligibility requirement for
doubt that the
96
arbitration.

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

957 F.2d at 513.
Id. at 513-14.
Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 12, at 135.
Robbins, supra note 18, at 428.
Neesemann & Nelson, supra note 12, at 135. See Masucci & Clemente, supra note 15, at

295.
195. The proposed amendment to Section 15 was published to the Board twice. Neesemann &
Nelson, supra note 12, at 135. Controversy surrounding the philosophy of the rule itself resulted in
the withdrawal of the filing. Id NASD is currently working with the Securities Industry Conference
on Arbitration on a revised proposal. Id.
196. Cane & Weinstein, supra note 9, at 401.
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Who Determines Arbitrability?
The proposed amendment provided that the Director of Arbitration would
determine whether the claim took place within six years from the "occurrence or
event" giving rise to the dispute." 9 Also, the amendment provided that the
eligibility determination of the Director would not be subject to review by the
arbitrators under Section 35 of the Code.' 98 With this amendment, the main
issue of the debate would have been resolved.
What is the "Occurrence or Event"?
The proposed amendment provided that the Director consider the following
factors when making an eligibility determination:
(1) the date(s) of the transaction(s) in question; (2) the date(s) of the
act(s) or occurrence(s), if not concurrent with the transaction(s), which
gave rise to the claim or which constituted the conduct complained of;
and (3) the existence of fraudulent concealment or misrepresentations
which cause the claimant to delay submission of a claim.' 99
Thus, the "occurrence or event" giving rise to the dispute would not be limited to
the purchase of the investment.
Is the Time Limitation Subiect to Equitable Tolling?
As noted above, the existence of fraudulent concealmentor misrepresentations
causing the claimant to delay submission of a claim would have been a factor in
determining eligibility for arbitration. 200 The proposed amendment, however,
also provided that the discovery of the existence of'a claim within the six-year
period alone would not suffice to make the claim eligible for submission if the
transaction, act, or occurrence forming the basis for the claim occurred outside the
six-year period.2"' Therefore, if the claim was discovered more than six years
after the "occurrence or event" giving rise to the claim, the time limitation would
not be tolled.
According to Section 15, May Claims be Litigated in Court Even Though They
are Ineligible for Arbitration?
Underthe new subsection 15(c), an ineligibility determinationby the Director
would not bar a claimant from pursuing a claim in a judicial forum. 2°2 This new
subsection would also have allowed the parties to retain all rights and remedies
available under applicable law.20 3

197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 401-02.
200. Id. at 402.

201. Id
202. Id.
203. Id.
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May the Claimant Effect an End-Run Around Section 15?
Section 15(a) would have been amended to eliminate the provision which
states "that the six-year eligibility limitation does not apply to cases directed to
arbitration by a court. Therefore, a court order directing the parties to arbitration
[would not have been] a determination that the matter [was] eligible for arbitration
under" the NASD Code. 2°4
Judicial Determination of Eligibility
Although the proposed amendment clarified the issues noted above, the
amendment would have likely created a different mess. 2°" The rule itself is
clear, but the commentary to the rule would have caused the problem. °6
Proposed subsection 15(b) provided that occurrences or events deemed
ineligible for arbitration by the Director could be introduced in the arbitration as
evidence relating to any substantive claim or defense.2 1 The commentary to the
rule, however, stated: "Notwithstanding the foregoing, the proposed rule change
a party from raising the issue of eligibility in any court
does not preclude
208
proceeding.
Accordingto the commentary, the claimant whose issues were determined by
the Director to be ineligible for arbitration could litigate his eligibility in front of
a court. 2 9 Even if the court found that the issues were eligible for arbitration
and ordered the matter to arbitration, the new subsection 15(c), however, would
have prohibited the parties from seeking enforcement of any arbitration agreement
where the claim had been declared ineligible under Section 15.210 What then?

V.

CONCLUSION

The amendment to the NASD Code discussed in Part IV would have ended

much of the eligibility debate. Unfortunately, because NASD withdrew this
proposed amendment, the courts will continue the battle of substantive eligibility
requirement versus procedural limitation.
Rationales for each view aside, a by-product of this debate that has not been
touched upon is the increased burden on the federal court system. Piled onto the
overburdened dockets of the federal court system are cases dealing with eligibility
for arbitration. As discussed in Part III, this author believes the approach taken
by the "substantive-eligibility" courts is the better-reasoned approach. This
approach, however, burdens the federal court system. The Eleventh Circuit has

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 401.
See Id. at 403,
See Id
Id. at 401.
Id.at 403.
Id.
Id at 402.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1996/iss2/4

24

Williams: Williams: Determining the Timeliness of a Securities Claim Filed for Arbitration:
Securities Claim Arbitration
19961

addressed this concern stating that "(cloncerns for judicial economy alone are not
sufficient to justify interference with the binding agreement of the parties."21'
Perhaps the concern for judicial economy was the driving force behind the
amendment to the NASD Code, providing that the Director of Arbitration was to
decide the question of eligibility for arbitration. Nevertheless, it is likely that
these issues will reach the Supreme Court ff not resolved by amendment. 2 2 As
one commentator most aptly noted, however, "Wi~n the meantime,213arbitration is
becoming the litigation battlefield that it was intended to avoid.
CARLA K. WILLIAMS

211. Cohen, 62 F.3d at 385 (quoting Goldberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc., 912 F.2d 1418, 1422
(11th Cir. 1990)).
212. Seamons, supra note 122, at 21.
213. Id
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